Should central banks really be flexible?

In this paper I show that central bank flexibility may not be desirable when it encourages trade unions to behave more aggressively. The argument is based on a model where risk averse trade unions interact with a central bank. A flexible central bank stabilizes economic shocks and reduces output volatility. This enables trade unions to realize higher real wages without risking the unemployment of some insider workers. Risk averse insiders demand higher real wages, generate more inflation and more unemployment. The overall e ect on welfare may be negative. A conservative central bank instead increases output and employment on average but raises output volatility. The argument also sheds new light on the issue of optimum currency areas. Wage claims are lower and employment is higher in a currency union if national trade unions expect the central bank to do less to secure employment of insider workers in their country. JEL Classification: E52, E58central bank credibility, central bank flexibility, Optimum Currency Area

Limits to international banking consolidation

Heterogenous banking supervision and regulation is often considered as the most important impediment for Pan-European Bank mergers. In this paper we identify other more fundamental reasons for a limited degree of cross-country integration in retail banking. We argue that the distribution of regional liquidity shocks may pose a natural limit to the extent of cross-border bank mergers. The paper derives the impact of different underlying stochastic structures on the optimal structure of cross regional bank mergers. Imposing a symmetry restriction on the underlying stochastic structure of liquidity shocks we find that benefits from diversification and the costs of contagion may be optimally traded off if banks from some but not from all regions merge. Under an additional monotonicity assumption full integration is only desirable if the number of regions with diverse risks is sufficiently large. --Bank Mergers,Financial Integration,Liquidity Transformation,Liquidity Crisis,Risk Sharing

Committees and special interests

Some committees convene behind closed doors while others publicly discuss issues and make their decisions. This paper studies the role of open and closed committee decision making in presence of external influence. We show that restricting the information of interest groups may reduce the bias towards special interest politics. Moreover, there are cases where benefits from increasing the number of decision makers can only be reaped if the committee's sessions are not public. In open committees benefits from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote is pivotal. As the number of voters increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This is not the case in a closed committee where costs and benefits of insincere voting only arise when a voter is pivotal. JEL Classification: D71, D72, D73Committees, common agency, interest groups, voting

Collective decisions with interdependent valuations

Many collective decision problems have the common feature that individuals' desired outcomes are correlated but not identical. This paper studies collective decisions with private information about these desired policies. Each agent holds private information which mainly concerns his own bliss point, but this private information also affects all other agents' bliss points. We concentrate on two specific mechanisms, the mean and the median mechanism. We establish existence of two symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria of the corresponding game and compare the performance of the mechanisms for different degrees of interdependencies. Applications of our framework include the assignment of voting rights in the council of the European Central Bank, the design of decision processes in teams, firms, and international organizations.collective decisions, asymmetric information, interdependent valuations

Der Preis der Arbeitsmarktreform

Eine Politik der Verringerung der Arbeitslosigkeit über mehr Flexibilität des Arbeitsmarktes stößt auf den Widerstand der Arbeitsplatzbesitzer als Verlierer entsprechender Maßnahmen. Wie könnten die Interessen der Insider in ein Reformpaket einbezogen werden? --

Demokratie, Reform und Wissenschaft

Reformen haben – auch wenn sie sich langfristig positiv auf die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung auswirken – nicht immer den Rückhalt bei den Wählern, der bei rein ökonomischer Betrachtungsweise wünschenswert wäre. Wie lassen sich „unliebsame“ Reformen besser „verkaufen“? Was sollten wirtschaftspolitische Berater bei ihren Empfehlungen beachten? Mit welchen Institutionen lassen sich Konflikte vermeiden? Ist eine Demokratieskepsis begründet? --

Unions, wage setting and monetary policy uncertainty

Recent theoretical research has studied extensively the link between wage setting and monetary policymaking in unionized economies. This paper addresses the question of the role of monetary uncertainty from both an empirical and theoretical point of view. Our analysis is based on a simple model that derives the influence of monetary uncertainty on unionized wage setting. We construct an indicator of monetary policy uncertainty and test our model with data for the G5 countries. The central finding is that monetary policy uncertainty has a negative impact on nominal wage growth in countries where wage setting is relatively centralized. This result is consistent with recent theoretical approaches to central bank transparency and wage setting. JEL Classification: E58centralized wage setting, Monetary policy uncertainty, union behavior

Financial integration, specialization and systemic risk

This paper studies the implications of cross-border financial integration for financial stability when banks' loan portfolios adjust endogenously. Banks can be subject to sectoral and aggregate domestic shocks. After integration they can share these risks in a complete interbank market. When banks have a comparative advantage in providing credit to certain industries, financial integration may induce banks to specialize in lending. An enhanced concentration in lending does not necessarily increase risk, because a well-functioning interbank market allows to achieve the necessary diversification. This greater need for risk sharing, though, increases the risk of cross-border contagion and the likelihood of widespread banking crises. However, even though integration increases the risk of contagion it improves welfare if it permits banks to realize specialization benefits. JEL Classification: D61, E44, G21.Financial integration, specialization, interbank market, financial contagion.

Fiscal Policy and Growth: Do Financial Crises make a Difference?

In this paper we assess to what extent in the existence of a financial crisis, government spending can contribute to mitigate economic downturns in the short run and whether such impact differs in crisis and non crisis times. We use panel analysis for a set of OECD and non-OECD countries for the period 1981-2007. The fiscal multiplier for the full sample for instrumented regular and crisis spending is about 0.6-0.8 considering the sample average government spending share of GDP of about one third. Altogether, we cannot reject the hypothesis that crisis spending and regular spending have the same impact using a variation of controls, sub-samples and specifications.fiscal policy, financial crisis, growth, OECD, EU, panel analysis.